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Abstract 
 
Under President Joko Widodo’s administration, Indonesia’s archipelagic outlook has been 
re-asserted as the basis of Indonesia’s foreign policy, by introducing the concept of Global 
Maritime Fulcrum (GMF). GMF is aimed put Indonesia as a single maritime power with 
considerable diplomatic influence in becoming a central role in two vast maritime regions. 
While the scope of maritime threats has been broaden, the establishment of maritime security 
should encompasses at least three key areas, namely settling unresolved maritime border with 
neighboring countries; combating illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing as well as other 
illegal exploitation of ocean resources; and combating maritime piracy and armed robbery at 
sea. Such problems are mainly due to the lack of national maritime security arrangement. The 
existing national legal frameworks in maritime security issues are still very sectoral in nature. 
This paper analyses Indonesia’s current sectoral legal framework on maritime security 
towards the achievement of GMF. It is argued that in maintaining national sovereignty, 
maritime security and regional stability, single national maritime security arrangement is 
needed. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
Indonesia lie astride a very strategic location that is between two 
large continents, Asia and Australia; and between two mass oceans, Pacific 
and Indian Ocean, which brings economic advantages for Indonesia. 
Indonesia’s   struggles   during   the   series  of  negotiation1  on  the  law  of 
                                                         
1 Series   negotiations   on   the   development   of   the   law   of   the   sea   was   started 
in   1958   when   the   first   united  nations  conference  on the law of the sea (UNCLOS 
I) took place. This first conference recognized firstly the concept of territorial sea but did 
not determine how far a state can claim territorial sea. The second conference (UNCLOS 
II) was held in 1960 but unfortunately nothing on archipelagic state came up during the 
meeting.  The  third  conference,  on  the  other  hand  was  successful  in recognizing the 
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the sea has made Indonesia as the largest archipelagic state in the world 
having certain rights and obligations under international law, which re-
sulted in the international recognition of the concept of an archipelagic 
state as envisages within Part IV of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention 
(LOSC).2 This Convention has made Indonesia’s sovereignty and sov-
concept of an archipelagic state.
2  Indonesia was a leading proponent in advocating the recognition of an archipe-
lagic state concept, within which state constitutes group of islands sees the islands 
and the surrounding ocean as a unity. Thus, the application of this concept would 
enclosed massive areas of waters in a state having groups of islands. For further dis-
cussion on the concept of an archipelagic state see further Read further Djalal, Has-
jim, Perjuangan Indonesia di bidang Hukum Laut (1979); Nordquist H, United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, a Commentary (1982); Wisnumoerti, 
Nugroho, “Archipelagic Waters and Archipelagic Sea Lanes” in Van Dyke, John M, 
Alexander, Lewis M, Morgan, Joseph R (eds), International Navigation: Rocks and 
Shoals Ahead? (1986) 198; Muchjiddin, Atje Misbach, “Some Aspects that Should be 
Considered in Designating Indonesia’s Sea Lanes” in Van Dyke, Jon M, Alexander, 
Lewis M and Morgan, Joseph R (eds), International Navigation: Rocks and Shoals 
Ahead? (1986) 212; Wisnumoerti, Nugroho, “Indonesia and the Law of the Sea” in 
Park, Choon-ho & Park, Jae Kyu (eds) the Law of the Sea: Problems from the East 
Asian Perspective (1987) 392; Jayawardene, Hiran W, The Regime of Islands in Inter-
national Law (1990); Kwiatkowsa, Barbara and Agoes, Etty R, “ Archipelagic Waters: 
An Assessment of National Legislation” in Wolfrum, Rudiger (ed), Law of the Sea 
at the Crossroads: The Continuing Search for a Universally Accepted Regim (1990) 
107; Agoes, Etty, R, Konvensi Hukum Laut 1982: Masalah Pengaturan Hak Lintas 
Kapal Asing (1991); Muchjiddin, Atje Misbach, Status Hukum Perairan Kepulauan 
Indonesia dan Hak Lintas Kapal Asing (1993); Djalal, Hasjim, Indonesia and the Law 
of the Sea (1995); Munavvar, Mohamed, Ocean States: archipelagic Regimes in the 
Law of the Sea (1995); Rothwell, Donald R, “Navigational Rights and Freedoms in 
the Asia Pacific Following Entry into Force of the Law of the Sea Convention” (1995) 
35 Virginia Journal of International Law 587; Bernhardt, JPA, “The Right of ASLP: A 
premier” (1995) 35 Virginia Journal of International Law 719; Djalal, Dino Patti, The 
Geopolitics of Indonesia’s Maritime Territory Policy (1996); Djalal, Hasjim, “Per-
kembangan Penanganan Masalah Tiga ALKI melalui Perairan Indonesia” (Paper pre-
sented at the Rapim TNI-AL, Cilangkap, Jakarta, 15 April 1997); Priestnall, Graham, 
“The Regimes of ASLP and Straits Transit Passage” (1997) 96 Maritime Studies 1; 
Churchill, R.R. and Lowe, A.V, Law of the Sea (3rd ed, 1999), 118-130; Djalal, Has-
jim, “The Law of the Sea Convention and Navigational Freedoms” in Rothwell, Don-
ald R and Bateman, Sam (eds), Navigational Rights and Freedoms and the New Law 
of the Sea (2000) 1; Johnson, Constance, “A Rite of Passage: The IMO Consideration 
of the Indonesian ASLs Submission” (2000) 15 The International Journal of Marine 
and Coastal Law 317; Rajan, HP, “The Legal Regime of Archipelagos” in Caminos, 
Hugo (ed), Law of the Sea: The Library of Essays in International Law (2001) 135; 
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ereign rights enclose more than 5.8 million square kilometres, which is 
even larger than Djuanda’s assertion, which did not include the exclu-
sive economic zone (EEZ).3 However, such location and massive areas 
of waters fall within Indonesia’s jurisdiction has exposed the nation to 
various maritime threats, such as illegal logging and fishing, smuggling, 
human trafficking, drug trafficking, and territorial breaches that affect 
its security policies.  At this point, maritime security emerged. While 
the scope of maritime threats has been broaden from time to time, it is 
argued that the establishment of maritime security should encompasses 
at least three key areas, namely settling unresolved maritime border 
with neighboring countries; combating illegal, unreported and unregu-
lated fishing as well as other illegal exploitation of ocean resources; and 
combating maritime piracy and armed robbery at sea. Unfortunately 
those three areas are the biggest problems Indonesia has over the secu-
rity and stability of Indonesia’s maritime domain. Such problems were 
mainly due to the lack of national maritime security arrangement. While 
in addressing maritime threats, which mostly transnational crime, inter-
national and regional arrangements are crucial, national arrangement in 
addressing the threats is also important. Although Indonesia has exist-
ing legal frameworks for several maritime threats, yet that frameworks 
do not encompass all maritime threats in one single arrangement. The 
existing national legal frameworks in maritime security issues are still 
very sectoral in nature. Some legal frameworks are also inconsistent 
Batongbacal, Jay L, “A Philippine Perspective on Archipelagic State Issues” (2002) 
122 Maritime Studies 18; Djalal, Hasjim, “Alur Laut dan Insiden 3 Juli, Tempo (Ja-
karta), 20 July 2003; Brownlie, Ian, Principles of Public International Law( 6th Ed, 
2003), 163-241; Batongbacal, J, “Barely Skimming the Surface”ASLs navigation and 
the IMO” in Elferink, A.G. Oude and Rothwell, D.R (eds), Ocean Managements in 
the 21st Century: Institutional Frameworks and Responses (2004) 49, Puspitawati, 
Dhiana, The concept of an Archipeagic State and its Implementation in Indonesia, 
PhD Dissertation, Law School, University of Queensland, 2008.
3  In 1958 Indonesia declared Djuanda Declaration which declared unilaterally Indo-
nesia as an archipelagic state. The concept of an archipelagic state enclosed waters 
surrounding the group of islands into single archipelagic baselines system, over which 
the sovereignty of archipelagic state is extended. While such concept was finally rec-
ognized and envisages within the LOSC, however, the concept was recognized with 
some modification, especially the recognition of other states in regard to the rights of 
passage through such waters. 
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with international legal framework on the same subject matter. In ad-
dition to this, a non-updated existing legal framework raised problems 
with regard to the law enforcement at sea. 
On the other hand, under the new Indonesian President, Joko Wido-
do, the concept of Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) was introduced. 
This shows the willingness of Indonesia to re-function the surrounded 
ocean as the unifying factors of Indonesian people.  The current govern-
ment is re-adopting the ‘three principles’ known as trisakti, which is a 
normative guideline that envisions Indonesia to be a sovereign power 
with a resilient economy and multi-cultural society.  Widodo underlined 
the need to develop a maritime strategy to gain optimum benefit as an 
archipelagic state in politically, economically, socially, and culturally. 
This paper analyses Indonesia’s current sectoral legal framework on 
maritime security towards the achievement of GMF. It is argued that in 
maintaining national sovereignty, maritime security and regional stabil-
ity, single national maritime security arrangement is needed.
II. INDONESIA GLOBAL MARITIME FULCRUM
Indonesia’s strategic location has made Indonesian waters very 
crucial to international shipping. Indonesian waters consist of various 
depth of the ocean. The Java Sea is very important for international 
navigation as it connects the continents of Asia and Australia.4  The 
eastern and western of Indonesia, which consist of deep seas, are very 
important for military activities.  The Timor Sea and Sawu Sea as well 
as the Java Sea provide and ideal route for submarines to navigate from 
the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean and vice-versa,5 which is im-
portant to the interests of the USA. Prior to the adoption of the LOSC, 
there are at least five major routes traversing Indonesian waters.6 Beside 
4  Hasjim Djalal, Perjuangan Indonesia di Bidang Hukum Laut, Binacipta, Jakarta 
1979, p.6.
5  Ibid.
6  The routes include: (i) through the Malacca Strait, providing access from the South-
China Sea into the Indian Ocean, (ii) from the South-China Sea going through the 
Natuna Sea to the Indian Ocean via the KArimata and Sunda Straits, (iii) across the 
centre of Indonesia through the Makassar and Lombok Straits, connecting the Pacific 
and Indian Oceans, (iv) From the Indian Ocean, goig through the Ombai and Wetar 
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its importance to navigational routes, Indonesian waters also crucial 
for other commercial activities, such as fishing, laying of submarine 
cables and pipelines, oil and gas exploitation and carrying out scientific 
research. Thus, it was not surprising that there were objections when 
the concept of an archipelagic state was firstly introduced. However, 
the LOSC, through its ‘package deals nature’7 manage to provides pro-
visions which accommodate conflicting interests, that is interests of 
archipelagic state and user maritime states, that is states having main 
interests of as much access as possible to the ocean, both for passage 
and the utility of ocean resources, in a balancing arrangement. 
As the leading proponent of the concept of an archipelagic state, In-
donesia was very keen to implement all provisions of LOSC, especially 
those relating to the archipelagic states. However, prior to the adop-
tion of archipelagic state concept within the LOSC, priority seems to 
change in Indonesia. Puspitawati8 argued before the adoption of LOSC 
Indonesia’s approach to ocean management was still to some extent a 
more territorial approach. She further argued that this approach was 
taken during those years because Indonesia wanted to show its strong 
policy commitment to the concept of an archipelagic state. However, in 
parallel with the emerging ocean governance framework based on the 
sustainable development of the law of the sea, Indonesia’s approach 
to ocean governance in 1990s has changed. It is submitted that in the 
Straits, passing through the Banda Sea before proceeding north, with one branch go-
ing to the Pacific Ocean while the other branch going to the Sulu Sea and (v) from the 
Pacific Ocean of the Sulu Sea through the Sulawesi Sea, passing through the Halma-
hera Sea, the Buru Strait and the Banda Sea to the Arafura Sea, then proceeding to the 
Torres Strait.
7  The package deals nature of the LOSC involves the reciprocal deals which adopted 
‘quid pro quo’.  It is argued that since the international arrangement on the ocean us-
age involve conflicting interests between states, it is considered fair if the given rights 
are return by certain obligations. As Agoes stated: “An example of the package nature 
of LOSC can be seen through the notion that the enjoyment of the rights and benefits 
involve, the concomitant undertaking duties and obligations.” See further Agoes, Etty 
R, “The Law of the Sea and Navigation: The Indonesian Archipelagic State’s Per-
spective” in Rothwell, Donald R and Bateman, Sam (eds), Navigational Rights and 
Freedoms and the New Law of the Sea (2000) 144, 146.
8  See further Puspitawati, Dhiana, The Concept of an Archipelagic State and its Im-
plementation in Indonesia, Ph.D Dissertation, Law School, Bussiness, Economic and 
Law Faculty, The University of Queensland, 2008
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1990s Indonesia seemed to have taken a somewhat more conserva-
tive approach to the development of its national ocean policies. The 
ocean related legislation enacted after the entry into force of LOSC 
showed less commitment to the concept of an archipelagic state. From 
the above observation, a pattern can be identified. Strong commitment 
to the concept of an archipelagic state before the adoption of LOSC can 
be seen as a strategy designed to gain international recognition of the 
concept. However, once the LOSC come into force, unfortunately, the 
priority seemed to change. Strong attention of Indonesian government 
in ocean affairs has begun to rise again prior to Indonesia’s reforma-
tion era. During the President Abdul Rahman Wahid Administration, 
the Department of Ocean exploration, later changed to the Ministry of 
Fisheries and Ocean Affairs, was established. Government attention on 
ocean affairs continues to grow; and ocean and maritime affairs were 
put in top national priority under President Joko Widodo Administra-
tion.9 The government seems to realize that the concept of an archi-
pelagic state should be the geopolitical consideration as well as basic 
philosophy of Indonesian ocean related policies.
Furthermore, under President Joko Widodo’s administration, Indo-
nesia’s archipelagic outlook has been re-asserted as the basis of Indone-
sia’s foreign policy, by introducing the concept of Global Maritime Ful-
crum (GMF). GMF is aimed put Indonesia as a single maritime power 
with considerable diplomatic influence, especially in becoming a cen-
tral role in two vast maritime regions – the Indian and Pacific Oceans. 
The concept of GMF was underpinned by government’s willingness to 
reassert the long-standing archipelagic outlook and saw the waters sur-
rounding the islands as the potential factor in economic development 
and serves as national strength. The GMF focuses on five key pillars, 
which include maritime culture, maritime resources, archipelagic con-
nectivity, maritime diplomacy and naval development. Following to 
this, in President Joko Widodo’s document outlining his five-years pol-
icy agenda, the archipelagic-oriented foreign policy was re-introduced. 
Such archipelagic-oriented foreign policy will be pursued through fur-
ther five key areas, namely: (i) promoting the resolution of Indonesia’s 
maritime delimitati8on disputes through maritime diplomacy, (ii) main-
9  Beside the Ministry of Fisheries and Ocean Affairs under President Joko Widodo 
Administration Ministry Coordinator of Maritime Affairs was also established. 
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taining Indonesia’s territorial integrity, maritime sovereignty, safety 
and social welfare in its outer islands, (iii) safeguarding the national 
resources and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), (iv) intensifying 
defense diplomacy and (v) diminishing maritime rivalries among major 
powers and promoting peaceful resolution of territorial disputes in the 
region.10
Furthermore Gindarsah and Priamarizki argued that the implemen-
tation of such concept requires the maintenance of at least three key ar-
eas, namely national sovereignty, maritime security as well as regional 
stability.11 It is argued that from these three key areas, maritime security 
plays important role in achieving national sovereignty and regional sta-
bility. It is argued that the establishment of maritime security should 
encompasses at least three key areas, namely settling unresolved mari-
time border with neighboring countries; combating illegal, unreported 
and unregulated fishing as well as other illegal exploitation of ocean 
resources; and combating maritime piracy and armed robbery at sea. 
The following section will discuss those three key areas, which unfor-
tunately remains as Indonesia’s biggest problems at sea.
III.MARITIME THREATS
As stated earlier, that the massive waters areas falling under Indo-
nesia’s jurisdiction, while brings economic benefits, also exposes the 
nation to various maritime threats, which mostly involve transnational 
crimes. At this point, maritime security emerged. Maritime security has 
many faces ranging from piracy and armed robbery, illicit trafficking 
by sea (narcotics trafficking, small arms and light weapons trafficking 
and human trafficking), global climate change, cargo theft to newly de-
veloped maritime terrorism. Maritime security sometimes appears to 
be a large and imprecise concept. In fact, in its development, maritime 
security involves many entities, from international, national, public as 
well as to private sector at establishing good governance at sea, fa-
10  See Joko Widodo and Jusuf Kalla, “Jalan Perubahan Untuk Indonesia Yang 
Berdaulat, Mandiri dan Berkepribadian: Visi, Misi, dan Program Aksi,” (May 2014), 
p. 12. Accessible at kpu.go.id.
11  Gindarsah, Iis and Primarizki, Adhi, “Indonesia’s Maritime Doctrine and Security 
Concerns”, RSIS Policy Reports, 2014.
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cilitating and defending commerce as well as naval mobility in term 
of navigational rights and preserving the freedom of the sea. It follows 
from the above that the meaning of maritime security can be seen from 
various perspectives. From a military point of view, maritime security 
has traditionally been focused on national security concerns in terms of 
protecting territorial integrity of any particular state from armed attack 
or other uses of force against other state’s interests. From a defense 
perspective maritime security has been broadened to include a greater 
range of threats. This, for example will include ensuring the freedom of 
navigation, the flow of commerce and the protection of ocean resourc-
es, as well as securing maritime domain from terrorism, drug trafficking 
and other form of transnational crime, piracy, environmental destruc-
tion and illegal seaborne migration. From shipping industry perspec-
tive, maritime security particularly refers on the safe arrival of cargo at 
its destination without interference to criminal activities. 
While there is no universal definition of maritime security, it is 
argued that maritime security should be distinguished from maritime 
safety. Maritime Security is “the combination of preventive and respon-
sive measures to protect the maritime domain against threats and inten-
tional unlawful acts.” 12 Whereas maritime safety” is “the combination 
of preventive and responsive measures intended to protect the maritime 
domain against, and limit the effect of, accidental or natural danger, 
harm, and damage to environment, risks or loss.”13 It is therefore sub-
mitted that the keywords for maritime security are: preventive and re-
sponsive measures, aiming at both law enforcement as a civilian and 
military requirement and defense operations as a military, in this case 
naval requirement. Meanwhile, the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) draws a distinction between maritime safety and maritime secu-
rity. The previous refers to preventing or minimizing the occurrence of 
accidents at sea that maybe caused by sub-standard ships, unqualified 
crew or other operator’s error. Whereas the later refers to the protection 
12 “Maritime Surveillance in Support of the CSDP: The Wise Pen team Final Report 
to EDA Steering Board”, available at: http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/
connect/44d0718042982ce1bb66bb24ab1546e8/The_wise_pen_team_final_report_
april_2010.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=44d0718042982ce1bb66bb24ab154
6e8.
13 Ibid.  
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against unlawful and deliberate acts conducted at the ocean.14 In sum, 
the crucial distinction is between man-made and unintentional risks and 
dangers.
 While the scope of maritime threats has been broaden from time 
to time, the establishment of maritime security should encompasses at 
least three key areas, namely settling unresolved maritime border with 
neighboring countries; combating illegal, unreported and unregulated 
fishing as well as other illegal exploitation of ocean resources; and com-
bating maritime piracy and armed robbery at sea. Unfortunately those 
three areas are the biggest problems Indonesia has over the security 
and stability of Indonesia’s maritime domain. The extended sovereignty 
over the massive waters area requires an archipelagic state to settle its 
maritime delimitation with neighboring states. The agreed maritime 
delimitation is needed toward the establishment of maritime security, 
since agreed maritime delimitation lead to easy law enforcement at sea. 
As the biggest archipelagic state, Indonesia neighbor with ten states, 
namely Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, the Philippines, Timor 
Leste, Australia, India, Palau and PNG. It is argued that agreed mari-
time delimitation with neighboring states serves as the baselines of all 
maritime threats occurring on the ocean. It is submitted that unresolved 
maritime delimitation will consequently resulted in the occurrence of 
various maritime threats. In addition to this, it also triggered continuous 
conflict between littoral states. Thus, unresolved maritime delimitation 
in fact can also be seen as maritime threats itself. Figure below illus-
trates Indonesia’s maritime borders with 10 states. While some of the 
borders have been resolved, yet many more borders await for amicable 
solutions.
14  P.K. Mukherjee and M.Q. Mejia, jr, “The ISPS Code: Legal and Ergonomic Con-
siderations” in M.q. Meija, jr (eds), Contemporary Issues in Maritime Security, 2003, 
33-34.
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Figure 1: Indonesia’s 10 Neighboring Countries15
In assuring maritime security over its waters, Indonesia has to dis-
cuss and make an agreement for maritime delimitation with these states. 
While discussions and meeting as well as agreements have been made, 
however, much remains to be done, especially maritime delimitation 
between Indonesia and Malaysia which poses continuing problems on 
the exploration and exploitation of natural resources. It is argued that 
the overlapping maritime space usually occurs over the EEZ and con-
tinental shelf, although there is in some cases the overlapping ocean 
space is territorial sea. The complete and agreed maritime delimitation, 
which has been settled, is maritime delimitation between Indonesia and 
Singapore, 16 as well as between Indonesia and New Guinea. 17 Whereas 
maritime delimitation, in this case delimitation of EEZ and continen-
15  Indonesian Navy, Hydrographic Department, 2011.
16  Maritime delimitation agreement was done in 2014 dan waiting for ratification 
process.
17  Maritime delimitation agreement was conducted in 1973
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tal shelf between Indonesia and Malaysia,18 the Philippines, 19 India, 20 
Thailand,21 Vietnam22 and Palau23 have not been resolved in some areas, 
although series of discussions as well as some agreements have been 
made. Meanwhile with Australia24 agreements have been made in mari-
time delimitation as well as further cooperation arrangements both on 
the sovereignty issue and management of natural resources. However, 
maritime delimitation between Indonesia and East-Timor25 has not been 
conducted yet since both states still focusing on land delimitation.26 
Furthermore, this research finds that unresolved maritime delimita-
tion consequently leads to the increasing rate of Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing (IUU Fishing), especially over the unsettled areas. 
It was recorded that in 2014 there were more than a hundred vessels 
conducting IUU Fishing, mostly over the unsettled areas, which cause 
Indonesia to lose about 24 billion dollars.27 The table below shows the 
increasing rate of IUU Fishing: 
18  Agreement on territorial sea took place in 1971, on continental shelf took place in 
1969, while agreement on EEZ has not been resolved and currently holding on unilat-
eral claim by each state. 
19  Agreement on EEZ has been conducted since 2014 but has not been resolved yet.
20  While agreement on EEZ has not been disussed, agreement on continental shelf has 
been conducted in 1974, 1977 and 1978.
21  While agreement on EEZ has not been discussed, agreement on continental shelf 
has been conducted in 1974, 1975 and 1978.
22  Agreement on continental shelf has been conducted in 2003 while agreement on 
EEZ has not ben done yet and meanwhile using unilateral claim by each state.
23  Only in informal meeting stage.
24  Maritime delimitation was conducted in 1971, 1972 and 1977.
25  Planning to conduct maritime delimitation agreement during 2013 meeting in dis-
cussing land delimitation.
26  For the detail and chronological discussion on the series agreements which has 
been made with the ten neighboring states see further Daryanto, “Perkembangan Ba-
tas Maritim Republik Indonesia dengan Negara Tetanggan dan Permasalahannya”, 
presented in Focus Group Discussion Pengelolaan Batas Wilayah Maritim Indonesia, 
Jakarta, 3 March 2016.
27  Steve Herman, Indonesia Declares War on Illegal Foreign Fishing Vessels, Voice 
of America, 23 December 2014, available at: http://www.voanews.com/content/indo-
nesia-declares-war-on-illegal-foreign-fishing-vessels/2570346.html, accessed on 14 
July 2016. 
332
Indonesian Journal of International Law
Volume 14 Number 3 April 2017
Table 1: IUU Fishing rate in Indonesian waters up to 2011�
No. Year IUU Fishing
1 2005 216 cases
2 2006 170 cases
3 2007 198 cases
4 2008 130 cases
5 2009 180 cases
6 2010 195 cases
7 2011 230 cases
As discussed previously, the ‘package delas’ natur of the LOSC 
involves the fulfilment of obligations upon rights given by the Con-
vention. While passage of foreign ships through Indonesian waters is 
allowed, however, under the LOSC, an archipelagic state may desig-
nate Archipelagic Sea Lanes (ASLs) in accommodating the passage of 
foreign ships.28 Being a major navigational route, Indonesia is also pre-
dominantly dependent on international shipping in term of international 
trade establishment. Thus, Indonesia cannot rigidly close its entire wa-
ters. As also provided within the LOSC that under archipelagic state 
concept, while Indonesia as an archipelagic state is given sovereignty 
and sovereign rights over massive areas of waters enclosed by archi-
pelagic baselines, Indonesia is also obligated to allow the passage of 
foreign ships through its waters. While ships’ traffic through Indonesian 
waters brings economic advantages for Indonesia, yet this condition also 
exposed the nations to various maritime threats which mostly transna-
tional crime. This condition demands complicated arrangement in term 
of law enforcement. A more traditional maritime threats underpinned 
by unresolved maritime delimitation is piracy and armed robbery at sea. 
In discussing piracy and armed robbery at sea, it is imperative firstly to 
present data on ships traversing Indonesian waters. However, since the 
number are numerous, for examples only data on certain ships, in this 
28  Indonesia has designated three north-south ASLs through Indonesian waters. De-
spite of the controversies, such ASLs would limit foreign ships passage to those ASLs 
to ease the monitoring of the passage. For further discussion on the designation of 
Indonesian ASLs, read further Puspitawati, Dhiana, “The East/ West Archipelagic Sea 
Lanes Passage through the Indonesian Archipelago,” Maritime Studies 2005 (140), 
1-13, 2005.  
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case Australian ships, traversing through Indonesian ASLs is presented 
as follows: 
Table 2: Estimate ship’s movements passing through Indonesia’s SLOCs relating to 
Australia’s trade29
Indonesian 
sea lanes
Tanker
G
as
Passenger
Livestock
D
ry bulk
Liner
G
eneral
D
B
O
O
ther
ASL I   168 14 7 46 329 159 64 7 20
ASL II     56 15 6 40 749 np 40 18   7
ASL III A 
& D
     9 73 np np 377   0 15 np   3
ASL IIIB      0   5 np 10     3 np   4   0   0
Indonesia 
(east-west)
  128   4 np   4 197 162 110   7 15
np: Refers to a cell with a count of less than 3 ships which are not published for confidentiality 
reasons
note: Routes determined on direct route between first/ last port in Australia and last/ first port 
of call overseas. It does not take into account ships draught limitations of some channels
While such particular sea lanes have not been include in scenarios 
where possible maritime threats take place, however, their susceptibil-
ity to maritime threats cannot be ignored. Among existing sea lanes, 
Malacca Straits is the most dangerous sea lanes, over which very high 
maritime threats rate recorded. Malacca Straits lies between three lit-
toral states, namely Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. For Singa-
pore, since it is heavily dependent on international trade, especially as 
a hub for transhipment trade and oil refining, the security over Malacca 
Straits is crucial. Similarly, eighty percent of Malaysia’s trade passed 
through Malacca Straits due to the location of its major ports, which 
lie astride Malacca Straits itself. In addition to this, Malaysia is also 
29  Bureau of Trade and Maritime Economics, Working Paper 69, Australian Maritime 
Trade 2000-02 2004-05, p 13, available at: https://bitre.gov.au/publications/2007/
files/wp_069.pdf, accessed on 14 July 2016. 
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concerned with protecting its resource-rich EEZ, which contribute to 
the fishing industry.  Thus, for Malaysia, sovereign control over the 
Strait and its resources are similarly important.  While in fact the se-
curity of Malacca Straits is also crucial for Indonesia, however, from 
its actions, Indonesia tend to give more attention to the importance of 
guarding its maritime border over the Malacca Straits in term of illegal 
fishing activities, especially with Malaysia. As stated by Dela Pena30 
‘[u]nlike its regional neighbors, Indonesia is not as dependent on trade 
and thus does not share their concerns regarding maritime security.’31 
She further argued that security issues for Indonesia on Malacca Straits 
are focused more internally, such as economic development, political 
reform, territorial integrity and militant Islam, rather than externally 
like piracy and terrorism.32 She further envisaged that since Indonesia is 
particularly sensitive to threats to its sovereignty, Indonesian navy saw 
preventing piracy is less important than patrolling its extensive mari-
time borders and dealing with smuggling, illegal fishing, and environ-
mental degradation.33  On the other hand, based on ReCAAP and IMB 
30  Joyce Dela Pena, ‘Maritime Crime in the Strait of Malacca: Balancing Regional 
and Extra-Regional Concerns’, Stanford Journal of International Relations, 2009, 
available at: https://www.google.com.au/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&
cd=2&ved=0ahUKEwif2qzEivLNAhUFupQKHeGfDM0QFggnMAE&url=http%3
A%2F%2Fweb.stanford.edu%2Fgroup%2Fsjir%2Fpdf%2FPirates.pdf&usg=AFQjC
NECHfd4bqBoDTQpgplI66PddKcbRQ&cad=rja, accessed on 14 July 2016. 
31  Joyce Dela Pena, ‘Maritime Crime in the Strait of Malacca: Balancing Regional 
and Extra-Regional Concerns’, Stanford Journal of International Relations, 2009, 
available at: https://www.google.com.au/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&
cd=2&ved=0ahUKEwif2qzEivLNAhUFupQKHeGfDM0QFggnMAE&url=http%3
A%2F%2Fweb.stanford.edu%2Fgroup%2Fsjir%2Fpdf%2FPirates.pdf&usg=AFQjC
NECHfd4bqBoDTQpgplI66PddKcbRQ&cad=rja, accessed on 14 July 2016.
32  Joyce Dela Pena, ‘Maritime Crime in the Strait of Malacca: Balancing Regional 
and Extra-Regional Concerns’, Stanford Journal of International Relations, 2009, 
available at: https://www.google.com.au/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&
cd=2&ved=0ahUKEwif2qzEivLNAhUFupQKHeGfDM0QFggnMAE&url=http%3
A%2F%2Fweb.stanford.edu%2Fgroup%2Fsjir%2Fpdf%2FPirates.pdf&usg=AFQjC
NECHfd4bqBoDTQpgplI66PddKcbRQ&cad=rja, accessed on 14 July 2016.
33  Incident around Sebatik Islands, where Malaysian Fishermen caught by Indone-
sian authority in doing illegal fishing. The territorial as well as resources concerns 
which outweigh piracy issues can also be noticed in the action of President Joko 
Widodo in Natuna Island concerning possible disputes on South-China Sea. See Joyce 
Dela Pena, ‘Maritime Crime in the Strait of Malacca: Balancing Regional and Extra-
Regional Concerns’, Stanford Journal of International Relations, 2009, available at: 
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reports, piracy and armed robbery exist in Natuna waters where Indone-
sian ASL I traverses.  In addition to this, Indonesia remains on IMB top 
list of piracy prone areas in Southeast Asia. From 2005 to March 2010, 
IMB recorded a total of 57 piratical and armed robbery attacks in the 
waters of Indonesia compared to 7 attacks in the Malacca Straits in the 
same period. Although the number of attacks is decreasing since 2005, 
however, it remains to be the IMB list of piracy prone area according to 
ICC-IMB Report during the first quarter of 2010.  The figure below il-
lustrate the number of piracy and armed robbery attack at sea, in which 
Indonesia remains the most dangerous piracy prone area:
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Figure 2: Six location of piracy and armed robbery attacks recorded during 2010-201435 
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34  ICC IMB, Reports on Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea against Ships 2014 Annual 
Reports, 2015
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IV. MARITIME SECURITY ARRANGEMENT:  INTERNA-
TIONAL AND REGIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK
As it is already known that LOSC is the only comprehensive con-
vention that provides almost all-legal aspect governing the ocean. 
While the LOSC does not expressly mention the term maritime secu-
rity, however, LOSC does provide several provisions relating to state 
response to the act of piracy within Article 100-107 and 110. In fact, 
there is no one single international convention, which regulates spe-
cifically on maritime security law. LOSC provides scope of conduct, 
which can be classified as piracy.35 It further envisages that piracy under 
the LOSC is limited to the act of piracy conducted on the high seas.36 
LOSC is silent on the act of piracy, which is conducted within national 
jurisdiction, while it puts piracy on universal jurisdiction.37 Williams 
further argued that while LOSC provide guidance for state response to 
piracy, however, it does not provide rules on the effort of private sector 
in combatting piracy.38
Since it was recognized that there is still matters which does not in-
cluded by the LOSC relating to maritime security and relating to piracy 
itself, international responses to the need of other legal arrangement be-
yond the LOSC by adopting the Suppressions of Unlawful Acts Against 
the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) Convention and its Protocol 
in 1988. Unlike LOSC, under SUA Convention, the scope of piracy was 
included piracy conducted within national jurisdiction of state. How-
ever, unfortunately, in such case, only flag state is capable in mitigating, 
investigating as well as response to the offence vessel that fly its flag. 
Further development on maritime security framework was pro-
35  Article 101 of the LOSC
36  Article 101 (a) of LOSC
37  Article 100 of LOSC. It also encourages states to collaborate in certain measures in 
suppressing the act of piracy on the areas beyond state’s national jurisdiction.
38  Williams, Simon O, ”International Legal Framework Governing Maritime Secu-
rity: Beyond UNCLOS”, The Corbett Centre for Maritime Studies, January 2015, 
available at: https://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/dsd/research/researchgroups/
corbett/Tactique-Briefing---International-Legal-Framework-Governing-Maritime-
Security---Beyond-UNCLOS.pdf. 
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duced by the Informal Consultative Process (ICP), established under 
the auspice of United Nations based on General Assembly Resolution 
No. 54/33 1999. The ICP itself has conducted at least three meetings in 
2001, 2002 and 2006. During 2001 meeting, it was proposed that the 
discussion of piracy should be seen from the various illegal activities 
at sea, such as illicit traffic in drugs, illegal migrant and other transna-
tional crimes.39 Till further argued that maritime security does not only 
focusing on sea control but rather to the achievement of maintaining 
good order at sea. 40 The second meeting of ICP in 2002 proposed the 
unification of maritime security and safety into single set and encour-
aged states to act consistently with the provisions of LOSC. In parallel 
with this, IMO also adopted International Ship and Port Facility Se-
curity Code (ISPS Code). The 2006 ICP meeting produced the Pres-
ent Addendum to the Report of the Secretary-General on Oceans and 
the Law of the Sea (A/63/63), which stated that response to maritime 
security was focusing on three key areas, which include: terrorist acts 
against shipping and offshore installations, piracy and armed robbery 
against ships and illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic sub-
stances. While none of those initiative initiate the formulation of one 
international convention which encompasses various maritime threats 
into certain measures, yet international cooperation between states were 
encouraged in addressing maritime threats. 
Meanwhile, in 2005, the 1988 SUA Convention and Protocols were 
amended. This Convention broaden state’s jurisdiction too not only flag 
state but also third state. It further envisages three new categories of 
offenses, namely: (i) using a ship as a means for committing terrorist 
act, (ii) proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on the high seas 
and (iii) transporting a person alleged to have committed an offense 
under other UN anti-terrorism convention. Further development on the 
legal framework of maritime security was also established by states in 
regional scheme. 
39  Makmur Keliat,  “Keamanan Maritim Dan Implikasi Kebijakannya Bagi Indone-
sia”, Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik, 2009, Volume 12 No. 1.
40  Geoffry Till, Seapower : A guide fot the Twenty-First Century, London, Frank cass, 
2004, 79.
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B. REGIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Since Indonesia is located in Southeast Asia, only regional frame-
work establishes in response to regional offences will be discussed. 
Since the southeast waters is considered as the most dangerous areas 
in term of maritime security, especially piracy, ASEAN has taken some 
measures in addressing such threats. Such measures include the estab-
lishment of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and ASEAN Maritime Fo-
rum (AMF).
While the ARF was established under the auspice of the IMO, the 
member of ARF not only comes from ASEAN’s member states. It con-
sists of 27 member states, which include 10 ASEAN’s states member, 
10 ASEAN dialogues partners, which include Australia, Canada, China, 
the EU, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Russia and the Unit-
ed States, one ASEAN observer, Papua New Guinea, and also North 
Korea, Mongolia Pakistan, East Timor, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. 
The ARF was established to encourage a consensus decision towards 
minimum institutionalism. It focuses on harmonization of measures in 
reaching regional stability. This instrument, however, only a declara-
tion that ARF states are willing to make further cooperation to address 
piracy and armed robbery at sea, with no detail mechanism on how the 
cooperation will run. It also did not specify about any obligations and 
thus although it was agreed to cooperate but such cooperation was still 
in voluntary based cooperation.  
Unlike ARF which not specifically refers to the issue of maritime 
security, the AMF was aimed as a forum to discuss responses to address 
maritime threat.41 While there is no agreed definition as well as scope 
for maritime threats toward the establishment of maritime security, the 
AMF envisages maritime threats to include piracy and armed robbery at 
sea, marine pollution and people smuggling as well as drug trafficking. 
Although similar to ARF that AMF dis not established as an institu-
tion, AMF’s contribution in addressing maritime threats was conducted 
through the auspice of ASEAN and its organs. Since the focus of AMF 
was on the security and safety of ports, it obligates states in the region 
to develop the following points: (i) safety of navigation, (ii) search and 
41  Makmur Keliat,  Keamanan Maritim Dan Implikasi Kebijakannya Bagi Indonesia, 
Jurnal Ilmu Sosial Dan Ilmu Politik, 2009, Voulme 12 No. 1.
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rescue, (iii) information sharing and (iv) exchange of visit authorities.42 
In addition to this, in fact, the AMF also wishes to address any threats 
involving transnational nature. Unfortunately, it is argued that what has 
been done by AMF is not optimal since the rate of piracy is still high. 
While AMF was aimed to provide a forum to discuss conflict over mari-
time for a, unfortunately, it operates only through discussions and does 
not produce international agreement or resolutions to address piracy or 
any other maritime threats. Compared to ARF, AMF is only operates in 
policy level with no work plan or any mechanism of implementation 
of what has been agreed to be done. It only listed the areas of commit-
ment of participated states towards maritime security issues. This way, 
the legal binding of any resolution reached during the meeting of the 
forum can be doubted. In addition to this, since none of ARF and AMF 
sets up certain agreement on law enforcement mechanism, it is argued 
that the difference between state’s national arrangements in addressing 
maritime threats would lead to insufficient law enforcement in prac-
tice. While international and regional measures is crucial in addressing 
maritime threats that is transnational in nature, it is argued that national 
measures may be more fruitful in supporting the existing international 
and regional cooperation. The following will discuss Indonesia’s legal 
framework in maritime security.
V. INDONESIA’S LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON MARITIME SE-
CURITY: TOWARDS GMF DOCTRINE
As stated in SUA Convention 2005, that this Convention broaden 
state’s jurisdiction to also criminalizing certain maritime threats, the 
analyses on national legal framework is crucial. Although Indonesia 
does not have single national law encompassing all maritime threats, 
in fact it has several laws in addressing some maritime threats such as 
illegal fishing and piracy as well as armed robbery at sea. In previous 
discussion of this research, it is argued that in order to achieved nation-
al sovereignty and regional stability towards GMF, maritime security 
plays a vital role. Furthermore, the establishment of maritime security 
42 Robert Mangindaan, “Indonesia Dan Kemanan Maritim : Apa Arti Pentingnya?”, 
available at: Http://Www.Fkpmaritim.Org/Indonesia-Dan-Keamanan-Maritim-Apa-
Arti-Pentingnya/.
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should encompasses at least three key areas, namely settling unresolved 
maritime border with neighboring countries; combating illegal, unre-
ported and unregulated fishing as well as other illegal exploitation of 
ocean resources; and combating maritime piracy and armed robbery at 
sea. While resolving maritime delimitation involve international agree-
ment with interested states, this section will analyses national law relat-
ing to IUU Fishing and Piracy as well as armed robbery at sea. 
Similar to international legal framework that does not have specific 
international convention relating to maritime security, Indonesia also 
does not have national legal instruments specifically regulates mari-
time security. However, it does not mean Indonesia does not take any 
measures in addressing maritime threats. While Indonesia is actively 
involving in both international and regional cooperation in addressing 
maritime threats, unfortunately, some nat8ional law addressing mari-
time threats are somehow poses problems. This section will analyses 
Indonesian Law relating to Fishery and Piracy as well as Armed Rob-
bery at Sea. 
As discussed previously in this paper, Indonesia continues to loose 
its potential income from ocean resources, especially fish. It eve an-
nounced that Indonesia lose about 24 billion dollars from ocean re-
sources sector. Underpinned by this situation, President Joko Widodo 
administration has declared policy on ‘sinking foreign fishing vessel 
that unlawfully enter Indonesian waters.’43 Such ‘sinking vessel’ policy 
is actually provided within Indonesian Act Number 45/2009 on Fishery 
(Act 45/ 2009), which legalizes the sinking of foreign fishing vessels 
upon court decision.  However, this policy raises problem as to its con-
sistency with the provision of LOSC. Especially, Illegal fishing con-
ducted over the EEZ. Article 69 (4) of Act 45/ 2009 gives Indonesian 
authorities to sink foreign fishing vessels conducting IUU Fishing in 
the areas under Indonesian jurisdiction, subject to sufficient prelimi-
nary evidence.44 While the ‘sinking vessel’ policy is in accordance with 
Indonesian Law, in this case Act 45/ 2009, however, it is questionable 
43  Jokowi: Tenggelamkan Kapal Pencuri Ikan!, Kompas.com, 18 November 2014, 
available at: http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2014/11/18/13004411/Jokowi.Teng-
gelamkan.Kapal.Pencuri.Ikan, accessed on 14 July 2016.
44  Article 69 of Act 45/ 2009. This Act further envisages that the sinking of the vessel 
can be conducted after there is court decision on the case. 
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whether such provision is in accordance with the LOSC. While the 
LOSC is silent on whether sinking the vessel who conducted IUU Fish-
ing is legal or not, it provides general measures that coastal states may 
take in addressing the IUU Fishing. Since the LOSC provides coast-
al state’s jurisdiction over the sea into various maritime zones, con-
sequently, measures allowed depends upon the zone over which IUU 
Fishing was conducted. Article 21 (1) (e) of LOSC clearly stated that 
“the coastal State may adopt laws and regulations, in conformity with 
the provisions of this Convention and other rules of international law, 
relating to innocent passage through the territorial sea, in respect of…
the prevention of infringement of the fisheries laws and regulations of 
the coastal State.” Thus, if the act of IUU Fishing occurs on the territo-
rial sea, the ‘sinking vessel’ policy might be relevant since the LOSC 
gives coastal states in adopting its own national law. However, if the act 
of IUU Fishing occurs on the EEZ, Article 73 of LOSC should be taken 
into consideration. Article 73 of LOSC provides that upon the viola-
tion of coastal state’s fisheries law, coastal states may take measures 
“including boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings”,45 but 
that “penalties for violations…may not include imprisonment…or any 
other form of corporal punishment.”46 As that article reads, it is submit-
ted that international law does not seem to support Indonesia’s ‘sink 
the vessels policy’ if it is conducted within Indonesia’s EEZ. While the 
‘sinking vessel’ policy may be relevant upon IUU Fishing conducted 
on the territorial sea, Amri argued that “Given that UNCLOS was con-
ceptualized in order to maintain peace and justice – as stipulated in its 
preamble – it is advisable for Indonesia to conduct judicial proceedings 
before sinking vessels which are allegedly involved in illegal fishing.”47 
In sum, while the ‘sinking vessel’ policy might be seen as a way to cre-
ate a deterrent effect, legal procedures at international level should also 
be respected and implemented accordingly. It follows form the above 
that the implementation of GMF also needs legal certainty especially 
in law enforcement mechanism. In implementing GMF, national law 
should be formulated in accordance with international law on related 
45  Article 74 (1) of LOSC
46  Article 73 (3) of LOSC
47  Amri, Ahmad Almaududy, “Is Indonesia’s ‘Sinking the Vessel’ Policy Legal?”, The 
Diplomat, 17 January 2015.
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subject matters.
Furthermore, domestic law of Indonesia relating to piracy and armed 
robbery at sea poses more complicated issues. In fact, Indonesian law 
relating to piracy is no longer up to date and thus insufficient. Such 
insufficiency was underpinned by the inconsistency between domes-
tic legal framework and international legal framework on piracy and 
armed robbery as well as on their law enforcement. In Indonesia, the 
act of piracy and armed robbery at sea is regulated under the Indonesian 
Criminal Act (Kitab Undang-undang Hukum Pidana/KUHP), specifi-
cally under Chapter XXIX of KUHP. KUHP was inheritable from the 
Netherland since the Netherland colonialized Indonesia hundred years 
ago.  While the Netherland has no longer made this KUHP come into 
effect, according to 1945 Indonesian Constitution, all legal product of 
the Netherland still valid until replaced by new law of Indonesia. In 
that case, there is no law, yet, which replacing the KUHP. Furthermore, 
there is inconsistency between piracy envisages under KUHP and pi-
racy under the LOSC. Under Article 101 of LOSC piracy is defined 
as “any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, 
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private 
ship or a private aircraft, and directed on the high seas.” Whereas Arti-
cle 105 of LOSC gives universal jurisdiction on piracy, in that although 
piracy is conducted on the high seas, yet every state may establish their 
jurisdiction.  While as discussed earlier that the scope of piracy was 
extended not only occur on high seas but territorial sea as well, the pro-
visions of KUHP did not include piracy that is conducted on the high 
seas.  Article 438 of KUHP envisages the criteria of piracy to include a 
person who become a seafarer of a pirate ships and a person (seafarer) 
who use a ship to conduct the act of piracy and armed robbery. Article 
439 and 440 of KUHP further provide the locus delicti of such both 
piracy and armed robbery. According to these articles piracy and armed 
robbery are a criminal action conducting over inland waters, such as 
river and Indonesian waters. At this point, important reminder must be 
noticed that according to KUHP, Indonesian waters refers to waters as 
provided within the Territorial zee en Maritieme Kringen Ordonantie 
1939 (TZMKO 1939), which only gave each island of Indonesia 3 nau-
tical  miles of territorial sea.  It is submitted that since the ratification 
of LOSC by Indonesia, TZMKO 1939 does not applicable anymore 
343Volume 14 Number 3 April 2017
The conservation of marine ecosystem from trawl usage...
and replaced by Indonesian Act Number 6 Year 1996 (Act 6/ 1996)
q on Indonesian Waters which acknowledge various maritime zones 
as provided within the LOSC. Unlike LOSC, TZMKO only recognize 
territorial sea and did not acknowledge various maritime zones as pro-
vided within LOSC.  This way, there is inconsistency between domestic 
legal framework and international legal framework. Thus, Indonesian 
waters referred by the KUHP is totally different from Indonesian waters 
provided by the Act 6 1996. This way, it is submitted that KUHP can-
not be used as legal basis in combating/ punishing the act of piracy and 
armed robbery at sea. Another specific domestic law which relevant 
for this discussion is Indonesian Act Number 17/2008 on Navigation. 
While this act can be said to represent Indonesian Maritime Law, how-
ever, this Act is silent on maritime security mechanism and specifically 
piracy.  This way, actually there is a lack of national policy and le-
gal framework on maritime security in Indonesia. If Indonesia want to 
implement the GMF doctrine, relevant national law such as fishery law 
and law on piracy should be made in accordance with international law 
relating the same subject matters.
Furthermore, since Indonesia does not have national legal instru-
ments specifically regulates maritime security, it is necessary to com-
pare with another state’s practice which already have a single legal 
instrument that comprehensively regulates maritime security. It is 
submitted that Australia is one of states which already have a single 
national arrangement on maritime security, known as Guide to Aus-
tralian Security Arrangement (GAMSA).48 It serves as a multi-agency 
documents which provides comprehensively various maritime threats 
complete with certain mechanism on how to deal with that also points 
out which institution is responsible in addressing certain threats. This 
kind of arrangement cannot be found in Indonesia. GAMSA divides 
between primary institution and secondary institution. While secondary 
institution responsible to give advice and policy in addressing certain 
maritime threats, the primary institution responsible for mechanism 
on facing maritime threats. Every chapter of GAMSA details various 
maritime threats and which institution is responsible for each maritime 
threats. This way, there will be no overlap in its arrangement. GAMSA 
can be used nation wide and not necessarily applicable only to Austra-
48  Guide to Australian Security Arrangement (GAMSA).
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lian Navy. This way, there will be universality jurisdiction in combating 
various maritime threats nation-wide. GAMSA is not only applicable 
for public institution but also involving private parties or relevant stake-
holder related to measures that should be taken in addressing maritime 
threats. Both technical and administration mechanism are provided in 
details by GAMSA. It also listed both international and regional coop-
eration joined by Australia and this way related institution may adjust 
its policy with the existing cooperation. GAMSA also define the scope 
of each maritime threat and in such there is similar perception in its law 
enforcement. It is argued that similar arrangement should be adopted 
by Indonesia.
Although Indonesia has no single national arrangement which 
specifically regulates maritime security, in the law enforcement 
mechanism, Indonesia has what known as Peraturan KSAL Nomor 
PerKSAL/32/V/2009 tanggal 4 Mei 2009 tentang Prosedur Tetap Pen-
egakan Hukum dan Penjagaan Keamanan di Wilayah Laut Yurisdiksi 
Nasional oleh TNI AL (Indonesian Chief of Navy Regulation Number 
32/2009 about Law Enforcement and National Security within Indo-
nesian Waters by Indonesian Navy), hereinafter called PerKSAL 32/ 
2009.49  This PerKSAL 32/ 2009 was formulated based on Article 9 of 
Indonesian Act Number 34 Year 2004 relating to Indonesian Army. Un-
fortunately, unlike GAMSA, this PerKSAL serves as guidance for only 
Indonesian Navy and does not applicable for other law enforcement 
institution. It cannot be used by other law enforcement institution other 
that Indonesian Navy. 
VI. CONCLUSION
This research finds that in implementing GMF Doctrine, national 
sovereignty, maritime security and regional stability should be estab-
lished. It is further argued that the establishment of maritime security 
should encompasses at least three key areas, namely settling unresolved 
49  Indonesia. Indonesian Chief of Navy Regulation Number 32/2009 about Law En-
forcement and National Security within Indonesian Waters by Indonesian Navy (Per-
aturan KSAL Nomor 32/2009, tanggal 4 Mei 2009 tentang Prosedur Tetap Penegakan 
Hukum dan Penjagaan Keamanan di Wilayah Laut Yurisdiksi Nasional oleh TNI-AL 
(Protap Kamla).
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maritime border with neighboring countries; combating illegal, unre-
ported and unregulated fishing as well as other illegal exploitation of 
ocean resources; and combating maritime piracy and armed robbery at 
sea. Unfortunately these three key areas remain the biggest problems 
for Indonesia.
Although Indonesia has no single legal arrangement that regulates 
specifically on maritime security, however, some Indonesian Law relat-
ing to certain maritime threats do exists. This includes national law on 
fisheries and piracy law, which is included within the KUHP. Unfortu-
nately, those laws are inconsistent with international law and for piracy 
law, envisages within KUHP is no longer up dated and thus cannot be 
used as legal basis in addressing piracy in Indonesia. This research fur-
ther argued that while international and regional cooperation is crucial 
in establishing maritime security, however, the strengthened of national 
law on maritime security is also important. Thus, it is submitted that 
in achieving the purpose of GMF Doctrine a single national maritime 
security arrangement is needed.
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